Losing Their Heads

Race, Sexuality, and the Perverse Moves of the European Enlightenment

In 2008 the British-born Nigerian artist Yinka Shonibare put the European Enlightenment on display. Dressing headless mannequins in Victorian-era costumes made from Dutch wax (otherwise loosely known as “African”) fabrics, Shonibare resurrected famous white philosophers and assigned them physical disabilities. The political economist Adam Smith has a hunchback; the chemist Antoine Lavoisier sits in a wheelchair; the mathematician Gabrielle Émilie Le Tonnelier de Breteuil misses a foot; the philosopher Jean le Rond d’Alembert leans on crutches; and Immanuel Kant lacks legs to move upon. As the curator Rachel Kent observes, “Shonibare’s alterations to these historical figures ... make rare autobiographical reference to the artist’s own physical disability—he was left partially paralyzed after contracting a virus at the age of 19—and interrogate our concepts of reason and unreason within the present.”

Shonibare’s Age of Enlightenment installation is a display of disfigurement, deformity, and compromised mobility. In it we see headless, disabled philosophers engaged in the production of reason—for example, Kant writes at a desk while holding a globe (see figure 1.1).

Moreover, these decapitated bodies are cloaked in so-called African fabric, suggesting a relation between race, travel, mindlessness, and nonupright comportment at the heart of reason. What Shonibare reveals is, in fact, the Age of Enlightenment’s hegemonic conceit. That is to say, even though the performative conditions of the Enlightenment’s philosophy and attendant notions of the subject were deformed and amputated by these relations, the illusion of self-determination, given as intact heads and otherwise normative (able) embodiment, was nonetheless advanced.

As such, the maintenance of this performative illusion required other bodies to bear the unruly, disabled, “outer-determined” consciousness previously disavowed. People of color, in particular, figured as the embodiments of this unruliness and always already movable by forces outside their control. Even today, as Denise Ferreira da Silva argues, such performative assumptions tragically persist in animating post-Enlightenment’s hegemonic disciplinary operations—operations that sanction the regulation of, among other things, public black kinesis. For da Silva the devaluation of black life is bound up with the “violent gesture[s] necessary to sustain the post-Enlightenment version of the [white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied, and bourgeoisie] Subject as the sole self-determined thing.”

This chapter’s task is, in part, to elucidate the inherent affectability of such violent enactments of white (European) self-determination. More precisely, while this idealized mode of self-determination imagines itself as guided and regulated by “universal reason” from within, it asserts this
ground by way of a deregulated, affectable trespassing. To be sure, this was a reckless roaming outwardly determined and mobilized by myths of racial and sexual difference. Moreover, because these performative contradictions, as Shonibare illustrates, originated along with the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment concepts of self-determination, reason, and freedom, we must return to these originary theorizations. In doing so, the fraudulence of an inherent association between Enlightenment subjectivity, whiteness, male gender identity, able-bodiedness, and a putatively unaffected and self-directed straight comportment will be exposed and will lead to an interrogation of its contemporary, unchecked, illusory reenactments.

To begin, being straight and narrow is the idealized mode of comportment for those invested in enlightened subjectivity and signifies a kind of transparent, morally upright, law-abiding movement. By straight and narrow, I mean something akin to Robert McRuer's definition of compulsory heterosexuality. For McRuer compulsory heterosexuality constitutes a regulative apparatus invented to police "the disorderly array of possible human desires and embodiments." Significantly, in McRuer's definition, the reach of said apparatus exceeds the sexual in its regulation of all "possible" expressions of wayward desire; in that way compulsory heterosexuality attempts to reform (straighten out) the errancy of queerness and the queerness of errancy. Unruly bodies. Unruly desires. However, because the errant exceeds its reach, straightness must continually reinvent itself in order to sanction its own impossible movement. Put another way, in the interest of its definition, straightness crookedly moves by way of the very disorderliness to which it is otherwise said to respond. That said, while I want to valorize this disorderly, out-of-step, and antiregulative interior kinesis at the heart of wandering, I also want to make a distinction between that valorization and a critique of the crookedness at the heart of the Enlightenment's straight philosophy. On the one hand, what is interesting about wandering is that its opening up of desire alongside its resistance to bodily and intellectual management enables a "contingent universalization of queerness/disability." However, because such movement, integral to the functioning of reason itself, was figured as that which corroded idealized comportment, the force of such a disavowal took crooked form. The liberatory divergence from Enlightenment ideals was, by definition, crooked when it morphed from wandering into trespass. As Shonibare so insightfully illustrates, European philosophers often stumbled through the world without their heads, and such constitutive stumbling was violently trespassive. For the victims of these trespasses, the crooked expression of reason meant epistemological or actual dismemberment. Joan Dayan's discussion of René Descartes's vampiric fantasies powerfully anticipates Shonibare's exposure:

The thinker of Descartes' Meditations in 1640 sets the stage for the 1685 edict of Louis XIV: the making of enlightenment man led to the demolition of the unenlightened brute. The thinking mind's dismembering or generative proclivities dominated a passive nature or servile body. Descartes sits by the fire. He dismembers himself. He can play with asking what remains if he takes off his ears, his arms, and removes all his senses in his urgency to know what constitutes his identity: "Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, I recognize that if a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind." The mutilation only aggrandizes this "I" that needs no senses and no body. Listen to Descartes's elation of discovery: "Thinking? At last I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me... I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason... I am a thing which is real... But what kind of a thing... —a thinking thing." As Dayan continues to argue, Descartes's self-dissection, albeit imagined, was essential for the consolidation of the "white universal [Enlightenment] subject," for whom the body was said to be superfluous. Tragically, however, such dissection was also literally carried out against black bodies, under such bloody measures as the Code Noir (Black Code). Again, the hegemonic labor of recognized Enlightenment was, in keeping with the scene with Descartes, a mutilating expression of a methodological disavowal. Further, the reckless dismembering reverie at the heart of reason foregrounded a transcendent white subject as author while consolidating black people's status as objects to be written, beings for whom the mind was said to not be the governing principle.

In fact, in the face of slave insurrections, most notably the Haitian Revolution, slaves were read as having a perverted will. This notion of a perverse will at once depoliticized and dephilosophized black rage and desire, but it also missed the ways that the enactment of racist, sexist enlightenment itself was inherently perverse. If to be perverse means "to turn away...
from that which is good, right or true," then the enactment of hateful reason was exemplary.11 As I argued by way of Shonibare, the racialized and sexualized particularization of the Enlightenment depended on a perverse, errant, (im)possible movement despite its pretense to an undifferentiated straight and upright comportment. These were its performative contradictions as a certain kind of nonstraight and nonteleological movement (Descartes's dream, the Code Noir) was at once essential and unsound for the production of reason.

At the same time, this is a dream whose murderous course has been met by the philosophical interventions and rehabilitations of those trampled upon. As David Scott, Paul Miller, Sylvia Wynter, and C. L. R. James (among others) argue, the actual fulfillment of Enlightenment ideals was achieved not by its idealized subject but on behalf of its pathologized objects.12 While this contradiction is not without its own contradictions, it is important to acknowledge, for example, that the "universal human right of liberty [was] to be found in the Haitian Revolution" and not within either Kant's categorical imperative or Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract.13 Still, the presumption of the absence of black will, or the imbrication of blackness itself with perversion and a perverse kinesis, was key to the racist consolidation of the Enlightenment subject. Further, even if theorized otherwise, the hegemonic discourse of race and sexuality as performatively perverse facilitated the Enlightenment's idealized subject's propertization of rational subjectivity while errantly sustaining its mythical conditions. This can be observed in the invention of race in the eighteenth century. Kant, the recognized Enlightenment philosopher, according to Robert Bernasconi, was the author of the "first theory of race worthy of the name"—a theory that scientifically figured race as a purposive differentiation.14 Significantly, such a theory formed out of a reading of explorers', missionaries', and settlers' travel reports (or more broadly, tales of intrusive itinerancy). This leads me to ask: if it's the case that Kant invented a theory of race and that such a theory emerged from a methodological crookedness, what would it mean to think about race as corporeal trespass?

This is an interesting question considering that Kant once 'claimed that people from Africa and India lack a 'drive to activity' ... never becoming anything more than drifters."15 But if anyone is a drifter, someone with a promiscuous relationship to space, place, and principle, then Kant is exemplary. What an encounter with racial and sexual difference in Kant's writing produces is a kind of drifting—an intrusive itinerancy induced by the "terrible struggle between imagination and reason."16 Gilles Deleuze describes this "illegitimate use of the faculties" in Kant accordingly.17

In many ways, understanding and reason are deeply tormented by the ambition to make things in themselves known to us. Kant constantly returns to this theme that there are internal illusions and illegitimate uses of faculties. The imagination sometimes dreams rather than schematizes. Moreover, instead of applying itself exclusively to phenomena ("experimental employment") the understanding sometimes claims to apply its concepts to things as they are in themselves ("transcendental employment"). But this is still not the most serious problem. Instead of applying itself to the concepts of the understanding ("immanent or regulative employment"), reason may claim to be directly applicable to objects, and wish to legislate in the domain of knowledge ("transcendental or constitutive employment"). Why is this the most serious problem? The transcendental employment of the understanding presupposes only that it abstracts itself from its relation to the imagination. Now, this imagination would have only negative effects were the understanding not pushed by reason, which gives it the illusion of a positive domain to conquer outside experience.18

This conquering outside experience, essential in the production of myths about civilization and barbarity, rational comportment and impulsivity, reveals the ways that the struggle among reason, understanding, and the imagination was not only terrible but also, for many, tragic. Paradoxically, this conquering outside experience prompted Kant's writing the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) in the first place.

Indeed, Kant's critical philosophy emerged because of his refusal, according to Deleuze, to abide by a dogmatic rationalist "theory of knowledge founded on the idea of a correspondence between subject and object, of an accord between the order of ideas and the order of things."19 In opposition to this tendency, which Kant perceives as a crisis in philosophical thinking generally and a crisis in metaphysics specifically, he proposes his own Copernican Revolution. Kant's Copernican Revolution involves "substituting the principle of a necessary submission of object to subject for the idea of a harmony between subject and object (final accord). The essential discovery is that the faculty of knowledge is legislative, or more precisely, that there is something which legislates in the faculty of knowledge[.]"20 For Kant "we," not God, "are the legislators of Nature."21 Kant
demonstrates this in his calling for the "tribunal" of reason, asking: what is reason and what is it capable of knowing about itself? How is the tribunal of reason the ethical scene of the Enlightenment?

Nevertheless, even while the tribunal itself importantly questioned an "epistemic model that takes as its model the colonization of the world (of experience)," the enactment of reason's colonization roaming continually undermined the tribunal's ethical value. Arguably, Kant's wandering transported him from a critique of reason's epistemic promiscuity toward a wobbly, trespassive invention of race. The performative betrayal of reason's limits, as Kant makes clear, is its methodological condition. Through an engagement with some of his precritical and critical writings, I explore the ways that ideas of race and gender perversely enact the very mythical scene and unregulated performances which the Age of Enlightenment was said to straighten out.

According to Miller, after Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, the mythic was the anti-Enlightenment, "a 'time', when the will was subordinate to the world." Because the mythos of racial and sexual difference instantiated a "lost plenitude" into which Kant dangerously wandered, he advanced the inherent whiteness of self-determination (of a non-drifting, if you will) to sustain the notion of Europe "being philosophically identical with itself." The illegitimate, affectable movement key to enlightened subjectivity, as da Silva, Gayatri Spivak, and others have shown, became externalized and figured as the kinetic (and fundamentally nonphilosophical and unenlightened) essence of the racialized and gendered.

In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764), for example, Kant's encounter with the "Negro" is nothing short of an empirical and epistemological wandering, where blackness is illegitimately and trespassively linked to stupidity. In the decades that followed the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant's thinking moved more "critically" to consider reason's relationship to dogmatic illusions, a relationship that demonstrates the fundamental discord between subject and object. Kant's critical philosophy, in fact, involved an interrogation of these ethically bankrupt relations, aspiring toward a system, as Curtis Bowman says, of "human freedom, both in theoretical and practical matters . . . [where] the enlightened person is [at once] rational and autonomous, accepting nothing without a reason, never acting without a reason, always pursuing his or her freedom and the freedom of others." Therefore, the person largely responsible for Kant's ethical reevaluation of the Enlightenment was Rousseau.

If Kant is the first author of a theory on race, then one might say that Rousseau prefigures the ethical waywardness of such a theory in his philosophizations of free comportment. If Rousseau "agrees to give ourselves up to the direction of the general will[;] . . . [however,] we sometimes fail to follow its dictates because our private will, present in us as individuals, conflicts with our general will, present in us as citizens. This conflict comes about largely through our inability to curb our desires and instincts." This tension between the general will (shared agreement, through laws, of appropriate public kinesis) and private will (the refusal of such kinetic constraint) animates Rousseau's philosophy. Rousseau, like Kant, was often moved by desire, straying from the straight-and-narrow course of his political and moral philosophy and wandering along the racialized and sexualized interests of his private will.

Indeed, Rousseau's complicated ties to the Enlightenment move in his grappling with the nexus of disembodiment, self-understanding, and self-determination central to the work of reason and freedom. Whereas Rousseau, in The Social Contract (1762), advocates the suppression of the private in favor of the general will, Kant's Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime suggests that the "principled" enlightened man is often "moved at the same time by a secret impulse [while] tak[ing] a stand-point outside himself, in thought, in order to judge the outward propriety of his behavior as it seems in the eyes of the onlooker." While Kant and Rousseau agree that self-determination is only possible through alienation, both concede the essential though dangerous presence of a "secret impulse" that agitates against that disembodied estrangement at every turn.

As previously mentioned, the problem with Rousseau is that the inhabitation of the secret impulse becomes the occasion of an ethical breach. Indeed, the secret impulse at once endangers the ethical, and presumably universally minded, imperative of the general will and, in Rousseau's and Kant's cases, portends the erasure of the other's right to philosophical subjectivity and kinesis. Moreover, what happens outside of the general will, outside of a self-determined and restrained moral philosophy, is a drifting into what da Silva terms "affectability." Because affectability—being moved by the outside—was and continues to be antithetical to enlightened subjectivity, it remains attached to racialized and gendered bodies.
instead of to the headless philosophers in question. In this examination of Rousseau's writings, then, I consider the long history of this paradox and how the unpredictable kinesis engendered by the secret impulse became permissible and unpunishable for bodies otherwise presumed to be innately self-determined. For bodies and ontologies said to lack such capacity, any unrestrained movement, or wandering, was paradoxically figured as at once impossible, injurious, and criminal.

The Social Contract

Beginning with Rousseau's *The Social Contract* is crucial because it lays the groundwork for his political investment in self-regulation. It is precisely in this document that freedom emerges not only as circumscribed and particular but as inextricably tied to self-abnegation. As such, in many ways, this document agitates against any private embrace of desire and the wandering that such an embrace potentiates. In fact, it is only after Rousseau's eventual break with the contract that such an embrace becomes possible—a move riddled with conflict and deeply shaped by racialized, sexualized, and ontological notions regarding not only who is a part of the contract but who has the right to wander against it.

The *Social Contract* begins with Rousseau's tortured musings over why it is that "man was born free, and [yet] he is everywhere in chains." These chains are symbolic and not actual, in that black bodies were, as a matter of fact, born unfree in galleys and on ships at the time of his writing. As Susan Buck-Morss observes, "No human condition appears more offensive to his heart or to his reason than slavery. And yet even Rousseau, patron saint of the French Revolution, represses from consciousness the millions of really existing, European-owned slaves, as he relentlessly condemns the institution." This unspoken, racialized, and sexualized contradiction moves Rousseau's political philosophy, illuminating most powerfully the ways that the social contract is, following Charles Mills, a "racial contract."30

This is clear in the fundamental assumption of the contract: for Rousseau, men come into the world free, become unfree as members of a family, and then rearticulate their relationship to freedom as they reach "the age of reason."31 Part of Rousseau's project is to imagine a successful governmental system that supports man's freedom even as it necessitates his alienation from that freedom. The assumption that men are born free and not contracted themselves racializes the document and, with it, the distinction between general and private will. More particularly, freedom itself moves by way of an unspoken racialization and gendering of self-interest. Consider the following two quotations from Rousseau:

To renounce freedom is to renounce one's humanity, one's rights as a man and equally one's duties. There is no possible *quid pro quo* for one who renounces everything; indeed such renunciation is contrary to man's very nature; for if you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man's actions of moral significance. . . . If everything he has belongs to me, his right is my right, and it would be nonsense to speak of my having a right against myself.32

Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association creates an artificial and collective body composed of as many members as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its common *ego*, its life and its will.33

In the first quotation, enslavement emerges not as trope but as material condition. As the philosopher argues, to commit such acts of unfreedom is to betray the very essence of mankind. To enslave another, as Rousseau contends, is to unlawfully assume the rights and will of another. Enslavement is as immoral as it is illusory.

The second quotation, however, argues that the existence of a republic requires "the total alienation by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole community."34 This state-sanctioned alienation is given as necessary, but it is also "unconditional." The reasons for the unconditional alienation are tied to Rousseau's beliefs that men share similar understandings of (and, by implication, relationships to) freedom, and that freedom is tantamount to self-preservation. For Rousseau, by rescinding one's rights to self (or private will), the state can function and eventually restore to the citizenry the freedom and rights sacrificed earlier (general will).

I wonder about this sudden ambivalence toward freedom. Why is it that freedom can and should easily slide into unfreedom in order for a reconfigured freedom to emerge as part of a moral and equitable society? As Kant later warns, "If freedom were determined in accordance with laws, it would not be freedom," a moral principle to which Kant and Rousseau were in continual and, perhaps for them, necessary violation.35 The ambivalence, however, that facilitates the slide toward unfreedom may be-
speak an anxiety around an imagined, racialized lawlessness, embodied in some ways by the “savage.” Maurice Cranston, a Rousseau historian and translator, argues that the need to make a distinction between man and his purportedly barbaric counterpart is bound up with an urgent desire to defend the moral imperative of governance.

Along these lines, Rousseau’s contradictory relationship with nature and its chief resident, the savage, is reason alone for republican governance and its requisite sacrifice of freedom. Indeed, even as Rousseau comes to embrace nature and self-interest, he worries about the freedoms that come with staying and straying too long outside the city, a straying that compromises his desire to stay “straight” and “upright.” Cranston argues that, for Rousseau,

It is partly because of this intimate connection between liberty and law that the freedom of man in a state of nature is inferior. The freedom of the savage is no more than independence; although Rousseau speaks of the savage being subject to natural law, he also suggests that the savage has no consciousness of natural law; thus Rousseau can speak of a man being “transformed” as a result of his entry into civil society from a brutish into a human, moral being. A moral being is, or can be, free in another sense than the political; if, instead of being a slave of his passions, he lives according to conscience, lives according to rules he imposes on himself, then he has a liberty which only a moral being can enjoy. The savage has no sense of this; for one thing, the passions only begin to develop with society, which explains why society can mark the beginning of a change for the worse as well as the beginning of a change for the better.

Implicitly, the idea that consciousness evolves from one’s immersion into city, civic life presupposes that nature is not conducive to appropriate exercises in self-determination, moral rectitude, and freedom. According to The Social Contract, to be in nature is to live a degraded and precarious existence. Interestingly, such codification corresponds to what Mills would call “the moralization of space,” where “the journey” away from “the outposts of civilization into native territory—acquires deep symbolic significance.”

In some ways this spatial moralization in Rousseau persists as a structuring tension. Whereas in the republic (the city) the idealized citizen-subject enjoys a circumscribed freedom, in nature (outside the city) freedom is morally bankrupt. Concerning the former state of existence, while this notion of freedom, as the condition of possibility for any encounter with one’s passions and desires, appears liberatory, it is bound by the kinetic constraints of the social contract; in the republic, freedom (paradoxically) takes the form of laws, as “registers of what we ourselves desire.” How one moves through the world is shaped not by the unbound ambulations of private desire but by an ethos of self-restraint and ant iwandering key to civic order.

Still, this state formation is figured as a kind of freedom from enslavement, where man is no longer subordinate to the will of other entities, such as nature or the ruling class. It is here where racism is both enacted and critiqued. At the time of Rousseau’s writing, enslavement (an exemplary state of subordination) existed as a trope in European Enlightenment scholarship and characterized a set of material conditions for black and brown peoples. Because there is a general lack of precision in defining the contours of enslavement’s meaning in The Social Contract, its radical potential as an antislavery document is foreclosed. Buck-Morss says, “Even when theoretical claims of freedom were transformed into revolutionary action on the political stage, it was possible for the slave-driven colonial economy that functioned behind the scenes to be kept in darkness.”

Moreover, the anxiety around a lawless desire, metaphorically embodied by the savage in nature and perhaps literally embodied by the contract-breaking and reforming black Jacobins themselves, racializes the relationship between Rousseau and civic desire (the general will). These racialized contradictions within The Social Contract complicate Rousseau’s position on freedom, and it isn’t until his traumatic exile that he reevaluates the meaning of freedom and desire—the performative tensions between private and general will and unbound and bound kinesis, respectively—apart from Enlightenment scripts.

What we’ll see more particularly in The Confessions is the beginnings of an embrace of private desire and, with it, an openness to wandering. But as with the racially and sexually circumscribed conception of freedom in The Social Contract, the embrace of private interest cannot be generalized. Plainly put, not everyone gets to roam freely; in fact, even as Rousseau wanders away from Enlightenment scripts of acceptable comportment, such movement is figured as problematic for racialized and gendered bodies. In this way, to wander is a privilege for those said to have already arrived at enlightenment. The unbound movement of all others figures as crime and pathology.
The Confessions

The Confessions (1789), Rousseau’s autobiography, attends to wandering’s inability to be generalized and the right to private desire. The text does this by particularizing the relation between freedom and wandering, using the language of anecdote and autobiography to do so. In lieu of an explicit critique of the contract, for example, Rousseau describes his childhood dissatisfaction with “filial” and economic dependence, lamenting, “I should have passed a calm and peaceful life in the security of my faith, in my own country, among my family and friends. . . . I should have been a good Christian, a good citizen, a good father, a good friend, a good workman, a good man in every way.”

But Rousseau wasn’t happy abiding by the civic, social, and economic expectations of the liberal citizen-subject. In fact, after accidentally missing the city’s curfew and being shut outside the city’s gates, Rousseau decides to sever his material relationships in Paris and roam physically: “The only thought in my mind was the independence I believed I had won. Now that I was free and my own master, I supposed that I could do anything, achieve anything. I only had to take one leap, and I could rise and fly through the air.”

From that point on, Rousseau wanders through the cities and countryside of France and Switzerland, benefiting from the kindness of strangers who feed him and give him shelter. In Geneva, he introduces himself to a famous Catholic priest, M. de Pontverre, who receives Rousseau into his home and sets up an encounter with a woman, Mme de Warens, who would later become a pivotal character in Rousseau’s life. This encounter is marked by feelings of enrapture and love at first sight. Mme de Warens eventually becomes Rousseau’s true love.

At once his soul mate and symbolic mother—he affectionately refers to her as “Mamma”—Mme de Warens quickly takes the young Rousseau under her wing. She coordinates employment opportunities for him with wealthy Parisians who pay him for companionship. He works in this capacity for some time while simultaneously continuing local apprenticeships with engravers and watchmakers. Significantly though, while living with Mme de Warens and M. de Pontverre, Rousseau recognizes (as do his temporary guardians) that he has yet to cultivate a strong sense of self. After being abandoned by his father at a very young age, he spends his early years wandering, being taken in and instructed by well-meaning older citizens in how to live his life. Such unattached and philosophically open comportment along with physical wandering figure as the cause for the absence of self-determination.

As such, Mme de Warens and M. de Pontverre decide that lessons on the catechism might help the young Rousseau in realizing the end of affectability. Paradoxically though, at this moment in The Confessions, the young Rousseau’s religious instruction unleashes the (dis)abling forces of desire and freedom, which upset the straight and self-determined interest at the heart of such schooling. A homoerotic encounter, for example, between Rousseau and an anonymous “Moor” at the seminary occurs during a break after the first religious lesson and a week before Rousseau’s official baptism by the church:

There is no soul so vile, no heart so barbarous as to be insusceptible to some sort of affection, and one of the two cut-throats who called themselves Moors took a fancy to me. He was fond of coming up to me and gossiping in his queer jargon. He did me little services, sometimes giving me some of his food at table, and he frequently kissed me with an ardour, which I found most displeasing. But, frightened though I naturally was by his dusky face, which was beautified by a long scar, and by his passionate glances, which seemed to me more savage than affectionate, I put up with his kisses, saying to myself, “The poor man has conceived a warm friendship for me it would be wrong to repulse him.” But he passed by degrees to more unseemly conduct, and sometimes made me such strange suggestions that I thought he was wrong in the head. One night he wanted to share my bed, but I objected on the plea that it was too narrow. He then pressed me to come into his. I still refused, however, for the poor devil was so dirty and smelt so strongly of the tobacco he chewed that he made me feel ill.

Next day, very early in the morning, we were alone together in the assembly hall. He resumed his caresses, but with such violence that I was frightened. Finally he tried to work up to the most revolting liberties, and by guiding my hand, to make me take the same liberties with him. I broke wildly away with a cry and leaped backwards, but without displaying indignation and anger, for I had not the slightest idea what it was all about. But I showed my surprise and disgust to such effect that he then left me alone. But as he gave up the struggle I saw something whitish and sticky shoot toward the fireplace and fall on the ground. My stomach turned over, and I rushed on to the bal-
cony, more upset, more troubled and more frightened as well, than ever I had been in my life. I was almost sick.

I could not understand what was the matter with the poor man. I thought he was having a fit of epilepsy or some other seizure even more terrible. And really I know of no more hideous sight for a man in cold blood than such foul and obscene behavior, nothing more revolting than a terrifying face on fire with the most brutal lust. I have never seen another man in that state; but if we appear like that to women, they must indeed be fascinated not to find us repulsive...

This adventure put me on my guard for the future against the attentions of the pederasts. And the sight of men with that reputation, by reminding me of the looks and behaviour of my frightful Moor, has always so horrified me that I have found it difficult to hide my disgust. Women, on the other hand, acquired a greater value for me, by way of contrast. I seemed to owe them a reparation for the offences of my sex, that could only be paid by the most delicate affection and personal homage. My memories of that self-styled African transformed the plainest of sluts into an object of adoration.44

During the week following the unwanted sexual advance by the “self-styled African,” Rousseau is baptized. It is upon his reintroduction into the world wandering around the city (this time Sardinia): “The first thing I did was to satisfy my curiosity, or perhaps to celebrate my liberty.”45 What I want to signal again is Rousseau’s repeated citation and refashioning of freedom—in this case, liberty. Subjected to the homosexual advances made by the “queer” Moor, Rousseau feels physically repulsed by what he identifies as the African’s “most revolting liberties.” Liberty here is an indictment, a pathology, and a problematic effect of one Moor’s pathologically errant roaming into sexual and racial freedom. The encounter also becomes the occasion for a general denunciation of manhood, the exercise of a free, unrestrained, cross-racial, and “unproductive” sexuality momentarily (dis)enables the kinetic conditions of enlightened subjectivity. Rousseau “leap[s] backwards.”

Freedom is a contradictory state, and for Rousseau sexual freedom is permitted if and only if the specters of racial difference and racial freedom have been vanquished. “The plainest sluts” now are “objects of adoration.” In this way, according to Spivak, “the freedom of desire is the condition of possibility of the concept of freedom.”46 But, given that in Rousseau’s

Confessions the freedom of desire is realized in (an often sexual) wandering and that such unbound movement is pathological for racialized and gendered bodies, the concept of freedom is applicable only to the Enlightenment subject. For Rousseau, after having traversed the racialized, queer threat of desire—the illegitimate roaming of the Other—he takes the “self-interested step” and leaves the seminary.

Rousseau’s wandering is said to resume only after he departs from the church. But arguably the erotic encounters inside the church facilitate a kinetic reprieve, or wandering away, from the choreographic constraints of reason. Still, in the end, the self-interested step, which paradoxically also initiates unrestrained comportment, takes precedence over other kinds of illegitimate movement—unanticipated drifts resulting from a young philosopher’s momentary enchantment with another man’s scar along with that other man’s return of gaze. This tension at the heart of The Confessions—of legitimate and illegitimate wandering’s (self-directed or otherwise) relationship to reason—expresses the performative contradictions at the heart of his philosophy. He describes the tenor of this struggle accordingly:

In me are united two almost irreconcilable characteristics, though in what way I cannot imagine. I have a passionate temperament, and lively and headstrong emotions. Yet my thoughts arise slowly and confusedly, and are never ready till too late. It is as if my heart and my brain did not belong to the same person. Feelings come quicker than lightning and fill my soul, but they bring me no illumination, they burn me and dazzle me. . . . During this stir of emotion I can see nothing quickly, and cannot write a word; I have to wait. Insensibly all this tumult grows quiet, the chaos subsides, and everything falls into place, but slowly, and after long and confused perturbations. Have you ever been to the opera in Italy?47

Rousseau reveals here how his passions “dazzle” more than they illuminate, making the kind of writing he wants to do hard. Being dazzled and stirred gets in the way of cognitive, disembodied enlightenment.

The “two almost irreconcilable characteristics” of a passionate temperament and a desire for order are what complicate Rousseau’s relationship to legitimized, enlightened comportment. Here is a self-professed wanderer who argues for the regulation of freedom, a philosopher interested in order but troubled by passion’s tendency to mess up and move astray.
These tensions in Rousseau have everything to do with the conflict between private and general will, what the philosopher himself desires and what he is taught to desire by others. But at the same time, these tensions between a private and general will are shaped by some deeply racialized and sexualized beliefs about wandering and governance. Those imagined as already enlightened and on track can move off course while the wandering of the ungovernable figures as excessive and pathological. In his final work, *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* (1782), Rousseau again legitimizes his wandering and right to freedom and does so through a reidealization of nature. But nature’s inability to be governed presents a crisis for the philosopher precisely at the moment when his roaming crosses with the unruly gait of the Other.

What we see in Rousseau is the simultaneous identification with and renunciation of enlightened self-determination. As we saw in *The Confessions*, for Rousseau wandering sustains an openness to the undetermined and unpredictable. But while he admits that this openness and the “thousand different passions that [keep him] in a state of constant agitation” are crucial to his philosophy, it also spells the end of his claim to enlightened subjectivity. This becomes clear in his doubled understanding of the nature that embodies this indeterminacy and that also provides the backdrop for his *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*.

Rousseau interprets nature in two ways. On the one hand, nature is the assemblage of woods, plant life, and flowers that accessorize his wandering. On the other hand, nature is the end of man; in *The Social Contract*, this end is racially embodied by the savage. In *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, the end evokes a metaphysical locale, the final landing place for a philosopher who has nothing left: “Everything is finished for me on this earth. Neither good nor evil can be done to me by any man. I have nothing left in the world to fear or hope for, and this leaves me in peace at the bottom of the abyss, a poor unfortunate mortal, but as unmoved as God himself.”

In both scenarios nature is the terrain on the outskirts of man, a place of deregulated passion and wandering’s embrace. Instructively, it is also the place for an encounter with God. Just on the other side of the moralized spaces key to Enlightenment subjectivity—the city and the secular—nature becomes the idyllic locale for Rousseau’s end-of-days wanderings. In some ways, nature provides the condition of possibility for a renunciation of enlightened subjectivity. However, once the roaming of the Other threatens Rousseau’s unbound travels, the assertion of that subjectivity, as we saw in *The Confessions*, occurs by way of a deeply antiwandering ethos. The Second Walk exemplifies this collision in Rousseau’s wandering.

On October 24, 1776, Rousseau takes an after-dinner stroll around the Boulevard Beaumarchais. He carefully examines the plant life that swarms the countryside, reflecting, “I saw myself at the close of an innocent and unhappy life, with a soul still full of intense feelings and a mind still adorned with a few flowers, even if they were already blighted by sadness and withered by care.” Immersed in nature and his feelings of depression and isolation, Rousseau wanders sadly. He is remorseful about not having fully lived, commenting that his life is nothing more than a set of misfortunes and disappointments. Eventually the reverie changes from sadness to pleasure as Rousseau reflects on his current state of unbridled meditation and daydreaming. This free and limitless rumination, however, is soon dramatically interrupted by the unforeseen onrush of a Great Dane. Rousseau describes the accident and subsequent paralysis:

> At about six in the evening I was on the hill leading down from Menilmontant, almost opposite the Jolly Gardener, when some people walking in front of me suddenly stepped aside and I saw a Great Dane rushing at full tilt toward me, followed by a carriage. It saw me too late to be able to check its speed or change its course. I judged that my only hope of avoiding being knocked down was to leap into the air at precisely the right moment to allow the dog to pass underneath me. This lightning plan of action, which I had no time either to examine or to put into practice, was my last thought before I went down. I felt neither the impact nor my fall, nor indeed anything else until I came to.

Night was coming on. I saw the sky, some stars, and a few leaves. This first sensation was a moment of delight. I was conscious of nothing else. In this instance I was being born again, and it seemed as if all I perceived was filled with my frail existence. Entirely taken up by the present, I could remember nothing; I had no distinct notion of what had just happened to me. I did not know who I was, nor where I was; I felt neither pain, fear, nor anxiety. I watched my blood flowing as I might have watched a stream, without even thinking that the blood had anything to do with me. I felt throughout my whole being such a wonderful calm, that whenever I recall this feeling I can find nothing to compare with it in all the pleasures that stir our lives.
The dog’s collision with the philosopher produces a (dis)abling severing of consciousness from reflexivity. He is violently thrust into a present and is born again; the shock of the collision sends him into the radically new state. Being unable to anticipate the Other’s errant insurgency forces Rousseau to “recompose all of [his] relations of speed and slowness, all of [his] affects, and to rearrange the overall assemblage.” There is no time to change the plan, and as a result a new plane of consciousness emerged. Further, this consciousness by accident (which is also a consciousness by surprise) produces a recombination of affect: “I felt throughout my whole being such a wonderful calm, that whenever I recall this feeling I can find nothing to compare with it in all the pleasures that stir our lives.” With this giddy recombination, new and important ontological questions concerning Rousseau’s relationship with the outside (world) emerge.

At the same time, Rousseau’s rebirth and subsequent amnesia actively forget that an animal was involved in the collision. All we know, at the close of the accident, is that Rousseau survives. Akira Lippitt says, “Animals are deprived of futures. Thus, in Rousseau’s contribution to the thought of animal being, the animal is confined to a perpetual presence that never advances in being or time, since the animal can never anticipate the arrival of what is unperceived, or unimagined.” Despite his compromised faculties (recall Shonibare’s series), Rousseau remains the reasoning subject and author of the Enlightenment. For the object of the Enlightenment, who is figured as its interruption and cause of disability—in this case, the animal and in the earlier case the “self-styled African” (both of whom, in the context of Enlightenment racist thought, share ontological status as well as an imbrication with nature)—such capacity is rendered impossible and illegitimate.45

Once again, the discord between freedom and desire along with an aggressively straight comportment result in the ambivalent imagining of wandering as the enactment or paralysis of reason. In some ways Rousseau’s wandering, the exercise of his private will, is the end of the Enlightenment. Rousseau’s interaction with the private desire of the Other threatened to move him off course, resulting in his crooked deployment of reason as racism, sexism, and homophobia. In this scenario Rousseau rejects freedom and the right to private desire. However, freedom and the exercise of private will is permissible once outside the domain of “man,” in landscapes figured as beyond “this earth.” To be even more precise, straight white male identities (figured always as the antithesis of savagery) get to move promiscuously from town to country, from the republic to nature, from general to private will. It is this promiscuity of movement, permissible within the gendered, sexualized, and ableist expression of whiteness alone, that makes Rousseau’s Enlightenment possible. As we move to Kant, we will again observe the trace of Rousseau’s ethical waywardness and, in particular, the ways that race and sexuality figure in reason’s crooked and (dis)abling desire to wander against the private will of the Other.

**Immanuel Kant**

Such crookedly unethical deployments of reason are indeed visible in Shonibare’s piece *Age of Enlightenment-Immanuel Kant* (2008). The piece features Kant as a headless and legless mannequin at a desk, writing with one hand and holding a globe in the other. The unethical moves in an imperial gaze where the Other’s right to self-definition and self-determination—the premise of Rousseau’s general will and Kant’s categorical imperative—collapses under Kant’s hand. Part of what Shonibare’s piece does in pulling together disability, philosophical production, and imperialism is express the performative antagonism at the heart of Kant’s philosophy—that is, reason’s self-imposed constraints are surpassed by its uncontrollable, colonially shaped kinetic desire to “conquer [or trample] outside experience.”

Beginning with an exemplary text from his “precritical” period, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764), and ending with the “critical” “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” (1788), I consider the methodological centrality of this colonialist wandering in Kantian philosophy. Further, I argue that despite the antiwandering ethos of the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Critique of Pure Reason* (1787, second edition), and “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” Kant authorizes such errant and impossible movement as reason’s very condition. His awareness of these performative contradictions is clearest in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but they nonetheless uncritically energize his obsession with defining race.

Kant’s precritical investment, according to Martin Schonfield, in the “unification of natural science and metaphysics” gave way to a faith in anthropology’s ability to provide knowledge about humanity. In many ways Kant relied on anthropology, and the (trans)national wanderings it required, to make conclusions about the racial and sexual requirements for enlightenment. The observations in the *Observations on the Feeling of*
the Beautiful and Sublime are, in fact, a product of Kant’s reading of travel reports and the “stories of the visits of savages to civilization.”

I start with the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime for two reasons. It clearly establishes Kant’s simultaneous critique and idealization of the empirical as guarantor of racialized and sexualized metaphysical insight. Second, the text was deeply influenced by Rousseau’s inherently wayward ethical philosophy, motivating Kant to, as John Zammito writes, “establish what men were actually like before going forward to a consideration of what they should be.” Problematically, however, the purported straightness at the heart of his ethical commitment depended on an inherently wayward methodological principle, the empirical. In the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant crookedly uses the empirical to make metaphysical claims about racialized and gendered bodies’ supposed unenlightened status. In this way he legislates his own colonialist wandering and, in so doing, renders the work a (dis)abling unethical scene of trespassive movement.

Kant’s Dandy

In the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant makes the self-conscious shift from philosopher to beobachter (observer). Significantly, the anthropological nature of this shift was inspired by a Rousseauian ethical commitment to establish and secure “the rights of man . . . by teaching others how to live,” as Susan Shell says. Kant’s translator John Goldthwait writes, “Whereas the Critique discusses faculties, the Observations describes people. The Critique is concerned with cognition alone; the Observations is addressed to cognition as integrated with the feelings and manifested in conduct.” In this way, while the Critique of Pure Reason cautions against the illegitimate use of the faculties in positing knowledge of objects in themselves, the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime sanctions reason’s trespassive movement as an expression of a moral commitment. By crookedly activating reason’s colonial desire to wander beyond experience, Kant undermines the categorical imperative he otherwise seeks to advance. These links are most explicit in his engagement with racial and sexual difference—a performative engagement that upsets the putative straightness (and nonerrancy) of Kant’s idealized moral subject.

Even though Kant’s translator, John Goldthwait, connects the categorical imperative, the bridge between individual desire and the common good, to the critical philosophy, it is posited as central to the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. For example, just as the sublime and the beautiful describe the different impressions made by objects and experiences, they also prescribe moral codes of conduct—that is, understanding is sublime, as is the “subduing of one’s passions through principles.” The sublime is also the place where the subdued passions and fear are in communion, at times regulating each other. For Kant the sublime is the reserve of the elderly; it is at this stage of life that the subduing of one’s passions is mastered. However, “if age does not perhaps diminish his [the elderly man’s] vivacity or bestow more understanding upon him, he is in danger of becoming an old dandy.”

The old dandy misbehaves, and the purportedly “trifling,” “dawdling,” and “childish” nature of his character and behavior figures as feminized excess. He is “without principles” and is easily swayed; in this way, the old dandy fails at the straight, principled comportment required by Kant’s Enlightenment project. More precisely, lacking principles is precisely that which distances the old dandy from having “a reasonable feeling for the beautiful and the sublime”; such principles otherwise enable someone to be moved while taking “a standpoint outside himself” in thought, in order to judge the outward propriety of his behavior as it seems in the eyes of the onlooker. Paradoxically speaking, however, despite realizing that one’s capacity for self-reflexivity differentiates the idealized moral subject from the “old dandy,” the absence of such self-reflexivity in Kant enables the precritical fiction of an accord between subject and object as reason’s methodological premise. As with Rousseau’s assessment of the “self-styled African,” the presumption of philosophical undevelopment is arrived at by way of an unprincipled movement. Put another way, akin to the old dandy, Kant’s reason is just as easily swayed.

This essential though dangerous errancy—which has everything to do with the waywardness of reason and desire, reason as desire—becomes explicit in the third and fourth sections, “Of the Distinction of the Beautiful and the Sublime in the Interrelations of the Two Sexes” and “Of National Characteristics.” Indeed, if we hold Kant to his own moral compass (the categorical imperative), we see how profoundly he has moved off his own beaten path. The categorical imperative holds that love of self is and should be commensurate with the common good. But what happens when the teleology of the categorical imperative is rendered crooked by errone-
ous, unprincipled, and skewed impressions? Or when, in Rousseau's terms, the exercise of private desire, or wandering, erodes the Other's right to unfettered movement? What we find in sections 3 and 4 is that this errant, nonteleological movement occurs in Kant's trespassive encounter with racial and sexual difference.

In section 3, Kant argues that the fair sex, whose proper point is the beautiful, is unprincipled and irrational. Her lack of principles causes her, like the old dandy, to "love pleasantry" and be "entertained by trivialities." She is easily moved, charmed, and swayed; this makes her resistant to enlightenment. Still, the supposedly disinterested philosopher nonetheless finds himself vulnerable to her "secret magic" and is careful not to concern himself with "impressions that relate too closely to the sex impulse[...]

What is instructive here is this notion that the sensual illusion presents a crisis for the moral disinterestedness said to characterize the Enlightenment proper. But here I also ask, isn't the sensual illusion the source of Kant's aesthetic and ethical judgments? In fact, Kant concedes in his discussion of obscenities and polite conversation that "judgment according to moral strictness does not belong here, because what I have to observe and explain in the sensing of the beautiful is only the appearances." In recognizing that an observation of appearances disables moral evaluation, Kant undermines his own epistemic conceit. In that way, by creating a category of those resistant to enlightenment based on appearance alone, Kant roams past his own ethical mandate. This again reveals reason's inherent errancy, its desire for unbound movement despite severing its own legs.

In many ways reason moves by way of sensory illusions, and this coupled with its inherent colonial aspirations lead to section 4, "Of National Characteristics." Writing with one hand and holding a globe in the other, Kant racially divides the world into zones of affective intensity. Affective intensity is identified here as the capability among first- and third-world peoples for feeling what is beautiful and sublime. For Kant the Italians and the French are more likely to be acutely aware of what is beautiful; the Germans, English, and Spanish are better observers of the sublime. By contrast, Europe's colonies are critiqued for their wayward conduct. In particular, he highlights the "Oriental" man's so-called "degenera[tion]... into the adventurous." For Kant the "adventurous" is the end of a kind of backward kinesis and is responsible for the simultaneous embrace of the wondrous and grotesque. It is the movement of an unenlightenment,

Methodologically speaking, these claims emerge as a function of an adventurous movement, what Mills calls "a paradigm example of impure reason." Similar to the "old dandy," whose reason is compromised by his vulnerability to "haphazard impressions," Kant is likewise affected. His philosophy, despite its pretense to the opposite, is energized by the very "inflamed imagination" he otherwise critiques. In regarding the "Negro" as an image of what is conceptually regarded as stupidity, for example, Kant's adventures are nothing short of trespasses.

These trespasses anticipate and perform the very critique of reason soon to follow. Akin to the "higgledy piggedy" furniture in Rousseau's inner theater, Kant's racism was a product of the faculties' own dizzied arrangements. More precisely, similar to Rousseau's opera, Kant's imagination gets stuck in the impressions of the moment, and from there reason sets off to wander. The observations on the fair sex, her wretched black counterpart, and the hopelessly dumb "Negroes" of Africa, for example,
illuminates the essentially wayward and illusory desire of reason to know things in themselves. As we move to Kant's critical philosophy, we see this trespassive tendency critiqued. This is crucial and carries with it an Enlightenment potential to critique empire. But at the same time, this radicalism is undone by reason's adventurous spirit—a spirit that reinstatess trespass as its very condition.

**Kant and the Ocean**

As Kant moved to the critical philosophy, he also arguably moved from the position of beobachter back to philosopher. Adorno might say that this move was necessary for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which was "an encounter of philosophy with itself." Philosophy's encounter with itself, among other things, enabled the self-reflexivity advanced and ignored by the precritical Kant. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is reason that is self-reflexive, asking: What is reason and what is it capable of knowing about itself? What are the limits of reason in its claim to know the world? Or, posed another way, does reason cease to be reason once it wanders past its own limits?

Responding to these inquiries, for Kant, requires a simultaneous critique and incorporation of empiricism (which claims that "all ideas originate in sense and perception") and rationalism (which believes that "knowledge derives from the intellect . . . [and] may be hindered by sense perception"). With the empiricists Kant shares the belief in experience as epistemically valuable, while affirming, along with the rationalists, the notion that there exist principles outside of experience that make knowledge possible. In Kant's examination, Deleuze writes, the "ends or interests of reason cannot be justified in terms of experience." As such, reason depends on knowledge conditions that exist outside of experience. Among other a priori conditions, for example, Kant says there exists a general concept of space as the "form of all appearances of outer sense." Time also exists as a transcendental ideal characterized by serial points and instants that are successive and, unlike space, not simultaneous.

When subjected to the sensorial consciousness of the reasoning subject, contradictions emerge within these figurations of space and time. Kant writes that the same object might have different "contradictorily opposed predicates[,] . . . for instance, the being and the not-being of one and the same thing in one and the same place." Kant attributes this problem to the limitations of space as a transcendental condition. Because space is restricted to "outer appearances," it lacks access to the "determinations of mind" essential for the total perception of objects. Time, however, supplants the perceptual limitations of space, by being an "a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever," and mediates between "inner states" and "outer intuition."

For Kant time is an important, if not the most important, transcendental condition for the dialectic of reason. What becomes problematic, however, is the assumption that time is infallible as a perceptual condition. Deleuze observes, "[Our] form of interiority means not only that time is internal to us, but that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in two; a splitting in two which never runs its course, since time has no end. A giddiness, an oscillation which constitutes time."

The dizzying nature of the ego's interaction with time is a fundamental metaphysical feature of the path toward reason. In fact, the dizzying, off-centered movements of the ego in space-time are arguably essential though dangerous for the work of enlightenment. While the a priori transcendental conditions of space and time are purportedly the grounds of reason's objectivity, space and time are embodied in the forms of "outer" sensibility and "inner states," respectively. Such convergence of sensibility and judgment not only undermines that objectivity but also presents the ethical crisis observed and enacted by the precritical Kant. This ethical crisis, to which the *Critique of Pure Reason* is said to respond, involves the idealized reasoning subject's enactment of self-determination over and against the object of reason's right to self-definition and private desire. In Rousseau this manifests as an indictment against the "queer" Moor's exercise in sexual freedom, and in Kant an antiwandering ethos is directed at the purportedly unprincipled, adventurous movements of racialized and feminized bodies. And all of this takes place in that expansive terrain between inner and outer states—an expansive terrain engaged through egocially driven wandering.

Indeed, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, this crookedness at the heart of reason is acknowledged by Kant. In his elaboration of the faculties, for example, Kant acknowledges this expansive terrain between states but argues for its regulation by way of an "objective reality in the subject." This objectivity emerges in the rhetoric of the transcendental deduction whereby the object must connect with a preexisting concept for cognition in order to be assimilated by the senses into consciousness. Once it does so and the
bridge between appearance and consciousness is complete, the object is perceived. The object, as perception, becomes assimilated into consciousness via its affirmation of the tenets of the concept, and from there the object becomes incorporated into the subject’s categories of knowledge. It can be thought. But in order to be thought, the object must first pass through the empirical exercise of the understanding:

In all knowledge of an object, there is unity of concept which may be entitled qualitative unity, so far as we think by it only the unity in the combination of the manifold of our knowledge, as, for example, the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a story. ... The impressions of the senses supplying the first stimulus, the whole faculty of knowledge opens out to them, and experience is brought into existence. ... But a deduction of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in this manner; it is not to be looked for in any such direction. For in view of their subsequent employment, which has to be entirely independent of experience, they must be in a position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from experiences. 91

The identification of an object set’s theme or the relationship between a single object and its representative concept establishes a manifold of cognition; Kant calls such a manifold a schema. But even as a rhetoric of regulation moves through this elaboration of the faculties, Kant admits that what the schematizing of data requires is the highly disciplined and cautious deployment of a potentially volatile faculty of reason, the imagination. The imagination, as “a faculty of representing an intuition of an object that is not itself present,” produces the condition of possibility for making synthetic judgments about the status of the object’s meaning in relation to space and time. 92 But, the imagination also introduces the specter of an anti-Enlightenment movement—wandering—that is both reason’s condition and absolute threat.

Working in tandem with the schema, the blind faculty (the imagination) paradoxically produces an image for a concept. In doing so, the blind faculty enables the work of reason’s other faculty, the understanding. But how does a blind faculty perform the requisite labor of forming an image of a concept through the association of appearances? Kant writes,

There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, the imagination. Its ac-

tion, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension. Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them.

But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions. 93

If the objective ground of reason is steadied through the transcendental deployment of the understanding, it is at the same time vulnerable to the tremors of a reckless mind. The imagination, as a deregulated, subjectively constituted faculty, troubles the objectivity said to characterize reason proper. In this way, the straightness of the path guaranteed by the transcendental deduction is deformed by its very conditions, as the “field of pure reason” is never not the scene of “manifold wanderings” and blind proceedings. 94

Still, it is precisely with the initial promise of reason that the threat of exceeding its limits is insinuated in the first place, a fact clearly demonstrated in the work of the imagination and the understanding. In many ways the faculties of imagination, understanding, and reason are “deeply tormented by the ambition to make things in themselves known to us.” 95 Deleuze observes that “the transcendental employment of the understanding derives simply from the fact that it neglects its own limits, whilst the transcendental employment of reason enjoins us to exceed the bounds of the understanding.” 96 Kant writes,

This domain (reason) is an island, enclosed by nature within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth—enchanting name!—surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion. Before we venture on this sea, to explore it in all directions, and to obtain assurance whether there be any ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land which we are about to leave, and to enquire, first, whether we cannot in any case be
satisfied with what it contains—are not; indeed under compulsion to be satisfied, inasmuch as there may be no other territory upon which we can settle; and secondly by what title we possess even this domain, and can consider ourselves as secured against all opposing claims.\textsuperscript{97}

If the oceanic produces a crisis for the teleological work of reason in making otherwise secure claims to reason (as land of enchantment) untenable, then why does it get resituated by Kant as the absolute space of reason's possibility? In other words, the ocean—which, in the context of the Enlightenment age, is arguably metonymic with the space of the transatlantic slave trade and the unconscious—becomes the unruly environment for reason's colonial kinesis. As such, colonialism appears methodologically justified here even as reason asserts an antiwandering ethos to curb such movement.

According to Kant, before one can engage in the crooked movements of rational deduction, one must consult the map of reason's delimited ground. Such consultation is necessary before blind travel and provides an important ethical injunction against reason's colonial desire. In this way, reason is moved by an ethos of wandering and antiwandering; even as reason ethically struggles against the very desire that provides its condition of possibility, phantasmatic transoceanic travel (like the map) is an expression of reason's very exercise. At this juncture, then, it is not only important to recognize this duality but to ask who the travelers are and who embodies the soon-to-be-staked-upon "farther shores."

Tellingly, two other critics of civilization ask these same questions and do so in the middle of the ocean: Sigmund Freud and Hortense Spillers. Concerning the subject of the Enlightenment, Freud argues that, within the psyches of great men, there exists a "discrepancy" between civilized and civilizing actions and what he refers to as "the diversity of wishful impulses"\textsuperscript{98}:

One of these exceptional few calls himself my friend in his letters to me. I had sent him my small book that treats religion as an illusion, and he answered that he entirely agreed with my judgment upon religion, but that he was sorry I had not properly appreciated the true source of religious sentiments. This, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which he himself is never without, which he finds confirmed by many others, and which he may suppose is present in millions of people. It is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of eternity, a

The oceanic is the site of an illusion, the poetic, and the worrisome promise of emotion's insight. The oceanic's material effects are gestured toward and momentarily foreclosed by Freud's admitting that he has not discovered the oceanic in himself. Interestingly, this tension between the possibility and impossibility of discovery is also at the heart of reason's kinetic ambivalence—that is, its desire to stake claims beyond its delimited ground. Nonetheless, in Kant's formulation, the ground is privileged; even as the ocean enables reason's exercise, it must be forgotten once the land is in sight.

Spillers is also attuned to this quality of the ocean and the oceanic as it operated in the pornotropic unnamming and misnamning of black Africans aboard slave ships bound for the New World. Departing from Freud's writing on the oceanic, Spillers argues for the ocean's continued relevance in thinking the psychoanalytic implications of the transatlantic abduction:

Those African persons in "Middle Passage" were literally suspended in the "oceanic," if we think of the latter in its Freudian orientation as an analogy for undifferentiated identity: removed from the indigenous land and culture, and not-yet "American" either, these captive persons, without names that their captors would recognize, were in movement across the Atlantic, but they were also nowhere at all. Inasmuch as, on any given day, we might imagine, the captive personality did not know where s/he was, we could say that they were the culturally "unmade," thrown in the midst of a figurative darkness that "exposed" their destinies to an unknown course. Often enough for the captains of these galleys, navigational science of the day was not sufficient to guarantee the intended destination. We might say that the slave ship, its crew, and its human-as-cargo stand for a wild and unclaimed richness of possibility that is not interrupted, not "counted"/"accounted," or differentiated,
Until its movement gains the land thousands of miles away from the point of departure.100

In the context of the transatlantic slave trade, blackness was wedded to the ocean, providing the condition of possibility and the limit of reason. More precisely, the black body, like the ocean, was pornotroped, broken open, phantasmatically imagined as anything but itself.101 Suspended in and as the disavowed oceanic of the yet to be named, black people were subjected to the wayward, fundamentally trespassive movement of colonial desire.

And while there is a potential critique of colonialism at the heart of Kant's exploratory allegory for reason, such critique is not motivated by an ethical concern for the ocean itself but rather for the "adventurous seafarer."102 Put another way, Kant knows that there is a real danger of being misled and making claims that are only possible when the limits of reason have been transgressed. But he also knows that in many ways this wandering (off reason's path) is required. Whether or not black people survive the recognized subject of the Enlightenment's trip is not as important as the survival of enlightened subjectivity itself. In the end, Kant's critical writings on race reveal the ways that his oceanic understanding of blackness— as at once unbound and subject to ceaseless discovery—provided the conditions for this ethical violence. I now turn to the philosophical making of that violence and the adventurous seafaring that constituted its methodological condition.

Against the Tide: Race and Kantian Contradiction

Although race is a subject in many of his writings, Kant's writings on teleology advance a presumably ethical theory of blackness. Resting on the purportedly stable shores of science and nature, Kant claims to avoid the ocean. I argue otherwise; as with Rousseau's "self-styled African," blackness becomes the occasion of an ethical breach—a wandering of the idealized Enlightenment subject onto terrain upon which the subject could not ethically stake a claim.103 In other words, blackness and black people endure Kant's and Rousseau's roaming reason— a mode of rationality that, despite its ethical pretense otherwise, denies black people's right to philosophical subjectivity and private desire.

Still, Kant's writings on race, particularly his work on teleology, are seemingly motivated by an antiwandering ethos. Using a teleological ana-
teleological analytic allows Kant's lifelong investment in the "unification of natural science and metaphysics" to, again, converge in an anthropo­
teleological analytic allows Kant's lifelong investment in the "unification of natural science and metaphysics"—the critical version of
the union between natural science and metaphysics—is for Kant enabled
by the concept of race.\textsuperscript{108}

Indeed, race became a crucial concept for Kant: it not only allowed for
a public response to many of his critics (many of whom defended a theory
of origins and polygenesis) but also helped to cement his "support [for]
the use of teleology within biology, as opposed to providing merely me­
canical explanations, as had become the tendency," according to Bernasconi.\textsuperscript{109} For Kant "a science of natural history would, by contrast, concern
itself with investigating the connection between certain present properties
of the things of nature and their causes in an earlier time in accordance
with causal laws that we do not invent but rather derive from the forces
of nature as they present themselves to us, pursued back, however, only so
far as permitted by analogy."\textsuperscript{110} Following this logic, race is an inherited
peculiarity that emerges as a purposive differentiation in order to ensure
the preservation of the species. Moreover, Kant believes that there is an
original diversity within the initial seeds of man that manifests itself when
the purpose of species differentiation is required.

This set of arguments concerning originary predispositions requires
that there be only one line of descent, that diversity be contained within
this line, and that racial difference be understood as purposive. These
arguments emerged in response to a theory of polygenesis popular at the
time of Kant's writing. Among others, Forster and François Bernier criti­
cized Kant's formulations by postulating the existence of multiple lines
of descent as well as by associating race with degeneration or the "accidental
imprints" of nature. Kant, in turn, questioned his opponents' claims
on the basis of the observation that such philosophies on race require a
"stray[ing] from the fertile grounds of natural science into the desert of
metaphysics."\textsuperscript{111}

To posit that race is an accidental effect of a chaotic shift in environ­
ment is to necessarily suggest that nature cannot serve as a category for
reason. If nature does not function rationally and with purpose, then its
availability to science is compromised. For Kant, nature, like moral law,
necessarily operates with purpose: "[W]e are bringing forward a teleological
ground where we endow a conception of an object—as if that concep­
tion were to be found in nature instead of in ourselves—[with] causality in
respect of the object, or rather where we picture to ourselves the possibility
of the object on the analogy of a causality of this kind—a causality such
as we experience in ourselves—and so regard nature as possessed of a ca­
pacity of its own for acting technically; whereas if we did not ascribe such
a mode of operation to nature its causality would have to be regarded as
blind mechanism."\textsuperscript{112}

Nature is organized as a system, as is man's relationship to his faculties
desire. If these realms were organized nonteleologically, they would run
the risk of proceeding blindly—calling once again to mind all of Shoni­
bare's headless philosophers. Inasmuch as Kant encourages his colleagues
to contemplate nature's design differently, he also cautions them about the
dangers of "ascribing powers to [causes], the existence of which cannot by
any means be proven, and whose very possibility can, only with difficulty,
be reconciled with reason."\textsuperscript{113} To speak of race metaphysically, then, is to
problematically wander, asserting an intrinsic value and meaning to con­
tent, when reason can only contend with form. Ironically, however, Kant's
theoretical position weakens when it comes to the subject of the blackness
of Africans. Just as "the problem of why Blacks were black, obsessed sci­
entists throughout the eighteenth century," Kant participated in the terms
of this inquiry by not only appealing to a possible biological origin—iron
particles and phlogiston—but also maintaining that the "Negro . . . un­
doubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate
the different races."\textsuperscript{114} Bernasconi theorizes how the "problem of Black­
ness" that obsessed the eighteenth century "kept [Kant] focused on the
question of the adequacy of mechanistic explanations offered in isolation
from teleology."\textsuperscript{115} I would further ask, what anomaly did blackness present
to Kant that would make him "st[ay] from the fertile grounds of natural
science into the desert [or ocean] of metaphysics"?\textsuperscript{116} In other words, what
initiated the shift from a language of purposive drives to "the lowest of all
remaining levels"?\textsuperscript{117}

Mills is also interested in those moments when blackness becomes
Kant's oceanic, the watery desert of, as Freud would say, his "wishful
impulses."\textsuperscript{118} For Mills, Kant's philosophy presumes that "the color of the skin
is a surface indicator of the presence of deeper physico-biological causal
mechanisms. If we think of the 'ontological' as covering what an entity
is, then the physical makeup of a dog will have ontological implications
(its capacity for rationality, agency, autonomy, etc.) and so similar will the
makeup of these inferior humans: race does not have to be transcendental to be (in a familiar sense) metaphysical."

Inasmuch as the telos of freedom and desire forged by the categorical imperative was figured as straight, upright, and principled, racialized and sexualized deviations (unprincipled movements) were its conditions of possibility. Standing with one foot in the ocean, and one foot on land, Kant giddily wandered in order to make empirical determinations of the black people in front of him. These determinations were staged at the convergence of the physical and metaphysical, where racialized and gendered bodies of color provided the brutalized ground for the crooked theorizations of truth, reason, and freedom.

In the end, for Kant and Rousseau, wandering described a movement antithetical yet indispensable for reason. In Rousseau's case, wandering provided the conditions for an embrace of private desire, a space to heal from the constraints of enlightened society. Yet wandering also provoked an ethos of restraint—a mobilization of Enlightenment racism, sexism, and homophobia—when enacted by the oppressed. Kant also worried about wandering and wanderers and in particular identified racialized and gendered bodies with a tendency toward errant movement. But it was Kant himself who wandered, who engaged in errant movement as an expression of (his) reason. In this way, wandering constituted method for both philosophers while embodying the end of the Enlightenment.

However, what the white European Enlightenment never anticipated was that those bodies who lived within that end and were consequently trampled, trespassed, and straightened out could reason, imagine, and philosophize themselves, achieving what was otherwise only murderously dreamed about. These headless philosophers, dreaming of monsters, never anticipated that those wandered upon also theorized with and against the Enlightenment, that they had objects of their own, "thing[s] [that had] no concept" and that were often "akin to freedom."}

I like a straightforward course, and am always reluctant to resort to subterfuges. So far as my ways have been crooked, I charge them all upon slavery.

HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL

Black philosophers have always theorized and embodied the Enlightenment even though its recognized authors did not cognize their engagement as such. To avoid playing "the game of the Enlightenment," to quote Louis Sala-Molins, we must recognize the centrality of these forgotten terrains of philosophical subjectivities. In other words, following Sala-Molins and David Scott, the Enlightenment presumed the absence of black philosophical performance. This is a move that is replicated in the discernment of the Enlightenment as a racialized and gendered monolith that un categorically violated as opposed to being fundamentally imagined through black life. In opposition, some theorists contend that the enactment of radical antislavery constitutes the Enlightenment's actual fulfillment. For example, with regard to the Haitian Revolution, Hillary McD. Beckles argues that "the blacks of St. Dominique . . . were first to declare the universality of liberty, to build it into the national constitution of Haiti, and commit a State to eternal opposition to chattel slavery. Enlightenment idealism was rescued and historically legitimized by enslaved people who were not expected to be its beneficiaries."

Moreover, in the context of the United States, nineteenth-century black activist-philosophers moved in Haiti's spirit to design and realize a hemispherically minded black enlightenment. While such philosophical movement sometimes coalesced in antislavery writings, which asserted the
tion through their opposition is enacted in (interruptions of) passage, tone, pulse, phrase, silence. But the dark matter that is and that animates this tradition sounds, and so sounds another light that for both Kant and Heidegger, in the one's advocacy and in the other's avoidance, would remain unheard." Moten, "Knowledge of Freedom," 274-75.

64. Fabian, *Out of Our Minds,* 8.
69. For example, according to Arun Saldanha, in his study of drugs, dance, and trance culture in Goa (in the late 1990s to the early 2000s), white participation in music, drug, and trance tourism (all variations of wandering) was motivated by a desire for transcendence. This desire for transcendence not only reinstated whiteness but also was accompanied by a figuration of Goa as unlivable. See Arun Saldanha, *Psychedelic Whiteness: Goa Trance and the Vicissitudes of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
70. McKittrick, *Demonic Grounds,* xxiii.

One. Losing Their Heads
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

28. Da Silva, Toward a Global Theory of Race, xxxix.
31. Rousseau, The Social Contract, 50. The internal contradictions, of which he is aware, begin to show up in Rousseau's writings on the family: "Man's first law is to watch over his own preservation, his first care he owes to himself; and as soon as he reaches the age of reason, he becomes the only judge of the best means to preserve himself; he becomes his own master. The family may therefore perhaps be seen as the first model of political societies: the head of the state bears the image of the father, the people the image of his children, and all, being born free and equal, surrender their freedom only when they see advantage in doing so. The only difference is that in the family, a father's love for his children repays him for the care he bestows on them, while in the state, where the ruler can have no such feeling for his people, the pleasure of commanding must take the place of love" (50–51).
55. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 25.
60. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 15–16.
63. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 68.
64. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 68.
65. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 68.
66. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 75; my emphasis.
70. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 76, 89.
73. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 98. I also want to acknowledge here that Kant’s references to the terrifying potential of the sublime yield the possibility of a critique of Western imperialism, but the explicit calculation of this relationship remains unimagined by Kant.
78. Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 110–13; my emphasis.
84. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 3.
85. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 71.
86. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 76.
87. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 77.
88. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 77.
89. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, ix.
92. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 165.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

93. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 144.
94. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 123.
95. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 24.
96. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 25.
97. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 257.
99. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 10-11, my emphasis.
102. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 257.
103. Rousseau, The Confessions, 73.
107. Schönfield, The Philosophy of the Young Kant, 8.
118. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 10.

Two. Crooked Ways and Weak Pens

20. Cott argues, “The positive contribution of passionlessness was to replace that sexual/carnal characterization of women with a spiritual/moral one, allowing women to develop their human faculties and their self-esteem. The belief that women lacked carnal motivation was the cornerstone of the argument for women’s moral superiority, used to enhance women’s status and widen their opportunities in the nineteenth century.” Cott, “Passionlessness,” 233.
WANDERING

Philosophical Performances of Racial and Sexual Freedom
Sarah Jane Cervenak