

Everybody Wants to be a Fascist

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I have chosen to discuss fascism for several reasons: because it is a real political problem, and not a purely theoretical consideration, and because I think it is a key theme to use in approaching the question of desire in the social realm. Besides, isn't it a good idea to discuss it freely while we still can?

A micro-politics of desire is not a proposal for the establishment of a bridge between psychoanalysis and Marxism, looking at them as completely formalized theories. This seems to me to be neither desirable nor possible. I do not think that a system of concepts can function with validity outside of its original environment, outside of the collective dispositions of enunciation which produced it. For example, much of the talk about pleasure is very interesting, but in contrast with desire, it is absolutely impossible to transfer these two notions, drawn from a certain type of practice and a certain vision of psychoanalysis, to the social field; in no way do they help us grasp the functioning of the libido in, for example, a fascist situation. Therefore, it must be understood that when I speak of desire I am not borrowing this notion from orthodox psychoanalysis or from Lacanian theory. I do not pretend to lay the foundation of a scientific concept; I will simply try to erect the scaffolding of a provisional theoretical construct in which the operation of desire within the social realm will be discussed. The starting point is simple: it is not possible to bind together in the same sentence the term "pleasure" with the term "revolution." You cannot say that a "pleasure of revolution" could exist. But nowadays no one is surprised to hear someone speak of a "desire for revolution" or a "revolutionary desire." It seems to me that this is tied to the fact that the meaning generally given to pleasure is inseparable from a certain mode of individuation of subjectivity, and psychoanalytic pleasure is even less independent from this kind of inward-folding individuation which, quite to the contrary, managed to find some kind of fulfillment within the confines of the couch. With libido and desire, however, things are altogether different.

Desire is not intrinsically linked to an individuation of the libido. A machine of desire encounters forms of individuation, that is, of alienation. Neither desire nor its repression is an ideal formation; there is no desire-in-itself, no repression-in-itself. The abstract objective of a "successful castration" partakes of the worst reactionary mystifications. Desire and repression function in a real society, and are marked by the imprint of each of its historical stages. It is therefore not a matter of general categories which could be transposed from one situation to another. The distinction which I propose between micro-politics and macro-politics of desire would have to

function as something which would lead to the liquidation of the pretended universality of psychoanalytic models, a notion which ostensibly secures the psychoanalyst against political and social contingencies. It is said that psychoanalysis is concerned with something which takes place on a small scale, barely the scale of the family and the person, whereas politics is concerned only with large social groupings. I would like to demonstrate that, on the contrary, there is a politics which addresses itself to the individual's desire, as well as to the desire which manifests itself in the broadest social field. And it has two forms: either a macro-politics aiming at both individual and social problems, or a micro-politics aiming at the same domains (the individual, the family, party problems, state problems, etc.). The despotism which exists in conjugal or family relationships arises from the same kind of libidinal disposition that exists in the broadest social field. Inversely, it is by no means absurd to approach a certain number of large scale social problems (for example, the problems of bureaucratism and fascism), in the light of a micro-politics of desire. The problem therefore is not to put up bridges between already fully constituted and fully delimited domains, but to put in place new theoretical and practical machines, capable of sweeping away the old stratifications, and of establishing the conditions for a new exercise of desire. In that case, it is no longer a simple question of describing pre-existing social objects, but one of engaging in a political struggle against all machines of the dominant power, whether it be the power of the bourgeois State, the power of any kind of bureaucracy, the power of academia, familial power, phallogocratic power in male/female relationships, or even the repressive power of the super-ego over the individual.

Three methods of approach to these questions can be schematized: first, a sociological approach, which we will call analytic-formalist; secondly, a neo-Marxist, synthetic-dualist approach; and thirdly, an analytic-political approach. The first and second approaches preserve the distinction between large and small social groupings, while the third approach attempts to go beyond this distinction.

Sociological analytic formalist thought attempts to disengage *common traits* and to separate out *species*, either by a method of *perceptible analogies*—in that case, it will try to settle small relative differences; for example: it will distinguish the three types of fascism: Italian, German, and Spanish; or, by a method of *structural homologies*—in that case, it will try to determine absolute differences, such as the differences between fascism, Stalinism, and the Western democracies. On the one hand, the differences are minimized, in order to disengage a common feature, and on the other, the differences are magnified, in order to separate levels and construct species.

Synthetic dualist neo-Marxist thought claims to go beyond such a system by always refusing to sever representation from a militant social practice, but generally this practice gets caught up in another kind of gap, this time between the reality of the desires of the masses, and the instances that are supposed to represent these desires. Sociological thought's system of description proceeded by reducing social objects into things, and by failing

to recognize the desire and creativity of the masses; the militant Marxist system of thought surmounts this failure, but constitutes itself as the collective system of representation of the desire of the masses. This system recognizes the existence of a revolutionary desire, but it imposes mediations on it: that of the theoretical representation of Marxism, and that of the practical representation of the party which is supposed to be its expression. A whole mechanism of transmission belts is thus put into place between the theory, the direction of the party, and the militants, so that the innumerable differences which run through the desire of the masses find themselves "massified," restored to standardized formulations whose necessity is deemed to be justified in the name of the cohesion of the working class and party unity. From the impotence of a system of mental representation we have passed to the impotence of a system of social representativity. In fact, it is no accident if this neo-Marxist method of thought and action is swamped in bureaucratic practices; this owing to the fact that it has never really disengaged its pseudo-dialectic from an obdurate dualism between representation and reality, between the caste who hold the passwords and the masses, who are heard alphabetizing and catechizing like good children. Neo-Marxist thought contaminates by its reductive dualism, its conception of the class struggle, its schematic opposition between the city and the country, its international alliances, its politics of "the peace camp and the war camp," etc. The two terms of each of these oppositions always revolve around a third object which, though a third, still does not therefore constitute a "dialectical synthesis"; this third object is, essentially, the State, the power of the State and the party which is a candidate for the taking of that power. Any partial struggle must be brought back to these transcendent third objects; everything must be given its *meaning* by them, even when real history reveals them for what they are, namely, lures, lures just like the phallic object of the triangular Oedipal relationship. In addition, it could be said that this dualism and its transcendent object constitute the nucleus of the militant Oedipus, which must be confronted by a *political analysis*.

In fact, this analysis refuses to let the disjunction remain between large social groupings and individual problems, family problems, academic problems, professional problems, etc. This analysis will no longer concern itself with mechanically chipping the problematic of concrete situations down to a simple alternative of classes or camps. It will no longer pretend to find all the answers in the action of a unique revolutionary party standing as a central depository of theoretical and practical truth. Therefore, a micro-politics of desire would no longer present itself as *representing* the masses and as *interpreting* their struggles. Which does not mean that it would condemn, *a priori*, all party action, all idea of party line, of program or even of centralism, but it would endeavor to situate and relativize this party action in terms of an analytic micro-politics which, at every turn, would place itself in opposition to the Manichean dualism that presently contaminates the revolutionary movements. It would no longer seek support from a transcendent object in order to provide itself with security. It would no

longer center itself on a unique object—the power of the State, which could only be conquered by a representative party acting in the place of and instead of the masses—but rather, it would center on a multiplicity of objectives, within the immediate reach of the most diverse social groupings. Starting from the plurality of partial struggles (but the term is already equivocal: they are not part of an already constituted whole), far-reaching collective struggles could be launched. There would no longer be mass, centrally ordered movements which would set more or less serialized individuals in motion on a local scale. Rather, it would be the connection of a multiplicity of molecular desires which would catalyze tests of force on a large scale. This is what happened at the beginning of the movement of May '68: the local and singular manifestation of the desire of small groups began to resound with a multiplicity of repressed desires which had been isolated and crushed by the dominant forms of expression and of representation. In such a situation there is no longer an ideal *unity* which *represents* and *mediates multiple* interests, but rather, there is a *univocal multiplicity* of desires whose process secretes its own systems of tracking and regulation. This multiplicity of desiring machines is not composed of standardized and regulated systems which can be disciplined and hierarchized in relation to a unique objective. It is stratified according to different social groupings, according to classes formed by age groups, the sexes, geographic and professional localizations, ethnic origins, erotic practices, etc. Thus, it does not realize a totalizing unity. It is the univocity of the masses' desire, and not their regrouping according to standardized objectives, which lays the foundation for the unity of their struggle. The unification of struggles is antagonistic to the multiplicity of desires only when it is totalizing, that is, when it is treated by the totalitarian machine of a representative party.

Seen from this perspective, theoretical expression no longer comes between social object and praxis. The social object is ready to speak without having to have recourse to representative instances to express itself. To make political struggle coincide with an analysis of desire, you have to place yourself so as to be able to listen in on whoever is expressing himself starting from a position of desire, and above all, if he places himself "off the track." In the home, a child is put down if he expresses himself "off the track," and this continues in school, in the barracks, in the factory, in the trade union, and in the party cell. You must always stay "on the right track" and "in line." But desire, by virtue of its very nature, always has the tendency to "stray from the subject," "to get off the track," and to drift from its proper course. A collective disposition of enunciations will say something about desire without referring it to a subjective individuation, without centering it around a pre-established subject and previously codified meanings. Henceforth, the analysis is not something which takes place after the terms and relationships of force are established, or after the *socius* is crystallized into various closed instances which remain opaque to one another: it participates in this very crystallization. The analysis has become immediately political. "When saying is doing": the division of labor between the specialists of saying and the specialists of doing ceases.

Collective dispositions of enunciation produce their own means of expression—it could be a special language, a slang, or a return to an old language. For them, working on semiotic flows, or on material and social flows is one and the same thing. Subject and object are no longer face-to-face, with a means of expression in a third position; there is no longer a tripartite division between the realm of reality, the realm of representation or representativity, and the realm of subjectivity. You have a collective set-up which is, at once, subject, object, and expression. The individual is no longer the universal guarantor of the dominant meanings. Here, everything can participate in enunciation: individuals, as well as zones of the body, semiotic trajectories, or machines that are plugged in on all horizons. The collective disposition of enunciation thus unites semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows, well short of its possible recuperation within a theoretical corpus. How is such a transition possible? Are we talking about a return to anarchist utopias? Isn't it an illusion to want to give the masses permission to speak in a highly differentiated industrial society? How could a social object—a subject group—substitute itself for the system of representation and for ideologies? Gradually, as I go on with this statement, a paradox thrusts itself on me: how is it conceivable to speak of these kinds of collective dispositions of enunciation while seated on a chair facing a group that is soberly arranged in a room? In reality, everything I say tends to establish that a true political analysis cannot arise from an individuated enunciation, especially when it is the act of a lecturer, who is unacquainted with the problems of his audience! An individual statement has no bearing except to the extent that it can enter into conjunction with collective set-ups which already function effectively: for example, which are already engaged in real social struggles. If this doesn't happen, then who are you speaking to? To a universal interlocutor? To someone who already knows the codes, the meanings and all their possible combinations? The individuated enunciation is the prisoner of the dominant meanings. Only a subject-group can manipulate semiotic flows, shatter meanings, open the language to other desires and forge other realities!

Let's come back to this question of fascism and to its relation to Stalinism and Western-style "democracies." We are not interested in establishing reductive comparisons, but, on the contrary, in complexifying the models. Any halt in the course of this analytic path will come only once one has reached a position where one has a minimum of real grasp on the process which has been put into play. There are all kinds of fascisms, all kinds of Stalinisms, and all kinds of bourgeois democracies. These three groupings break up as soon as one begins to consider, at the heart of each grouping, the relative status of, for example, the industrial machine, the banking machine, the military machine, the politico-police machine, the techno-structures of the State, the Church, etc. The analysis will have to consider each of these sub-groupings while, at the same time, not losing sight of the fact that, in each case, it is still concerned only with provisional stages of molecular reduction. Contemporary totalitarian systems have in-

vented a certain number of prototypes for a police party; the Nazi police party would merit being studied in comparison with the Stalinist police party; in fact, perhaps they are closer to each other than the corresponding structures of the State. It would be interesting to pick out the different kinds of machines of desire that go into their composition. But we would then discover that it is not enough to consider things from so far off. The analysis would have to progress constantly in the direction of a molecularization of its object to be able to grasp, to the nearest place, the role that it plays in the heart of the large groupings within which it functions. There is not *one* Nazi party; not only has the Nazi party evolved, but during each period it has had a different function, according to the various domains wherein it has carried out its action. Himmler's SS machine was not the same as the SA machine or as that of the mass organizations conceived by the Strasser brothers. Certain points of view of quasi-religious inspiration are found at the very heart of the SS machine—remember that Himmler wished the SS to be trained using methods similar to those of the Jesuits—coexisting with openly sadistic practices, like those of a Heydrich... We are not talking about a gratuitous investigation, but about a refusal of those simplifications which prevent us from perceiving the *genealogy* and the *permanence* of certain fascist machineries. The Inquisition itself was already the setting into place of a certain type of fascist machinery which was to keep developing and to keep perfecting itself up to our own day. Thus, we see that the analysis of the molecular components of fascism can deal with quite a variety of areas. It is the same fascism under different forms which continues to operate in the family, in school, or in a trade union. A struggle against the modern forms of totalitarianism can be organized only if we are prepared to recognize the continuity of this machine.

There are all kinds of ways in which to approach these questions concerning desire in the social field. We can simply ignore them, or else reduce them to simplified political alternatives. We can also try to grasp their mutations, their displacements, and the new possibilities which they afford to revolutionary action. Stalinism and fascism are generally placed in opposition, since they seemingly answer to radically different definitions, while the different forms of fascism have been placed under the same rubric. And yet, the differences are, perhaps, much greater between the fascisms than between certain aspects of Stalinism and certain aspects of Naziism. It is in no way contradictory to want to preserve these differences, and, at the same time, wish to disengage the continuity of a totalitarian *machine* which pursues its course through *all structures*: fascist, Stalinist, democratic-bourgeois, etc. Without going all the way back to the Late Empire of Diocletian and Constantine, its filiation can be traced from the repression against the Communards of 1871, right up to its present forms. In this way, different totalitarian systems produced different formulas for a collective seizing of desire, depending on the transformation of productive forces and the relationships of production. We must endeavor to disengage its *machinic composition*, much as we would a chemical composition, but a social

chemistry of desire which runs not only through History, but also through the whole social space. The historical transversality of the machines of desire on which totalitarian systems depend is, in fact, inseparable from their social transversality. Therefore, the analysis of fascism is not simply a historian's speciality. I repeat: what fascism set in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space. A whole totalitarian chemistry manipulates the structures of state, political and union structures, institutional and family structures, and even individual structures, inasmuch as one can speak of a sort of fascism of the super-ego in situations of guilt and neurosis.

But what is this bizarre totalitarian machine that traverses time and space? Some prop in a science-fiction story? I can already hear the sarcastic remarks, of the right-minded psychoanalysts, Marxists, and epistemologists. "What a confusion of levels! Everything's been thrown into the same sack..." May I point out that it was only by conducting an analysis at the molecular and atomic levels that the chemists later succeeded in realizing syntheses of complex elements! But they will still say: that's nothing but mechanistic talk! Granted; up to this point we're only talking about a comparison. And besides, what's the use of polemicizing: the only people who will put up with listening to me any longer are those who feel the interest and urgency of the micro-political anti-fascist struggle that I'm talking about. The evolution of the social division of labor has necessitated the creation of ever more gigantic productive groupings. But this gigantism of production has involved an increasingly accentuated molecularization of those human elements which it put into play in the machinic combinations of industry, of the economy, of education, of information, etc. It is never a man who works—the same can be said for desire—but a combination of organs and machines. A man does not communicate with his fellow men: a transhuman chain of organs is formed and enters into conjunction with semiotic links and an intersection of material flows. It is because the productive forces of today cause the explosion of traditional human territorialities, that they are capable of liberating the atomic energy of desire. Because this phenomenon is irreversible, and because its revolutionary scope cannot be calculated, the totalitarian-bureaucratic capitalist and socialist systems are forced to constantly perfect and miniaturize their repressive machines. Therefore, it seems to me that the constant search for this machinic composition of totalitarian powers is the indispensable corollary of a micro-political struggle for the liberation of desire. The minute you stop facing it head-on, you can abruptly oscillate from a position of revolutionary openness to a position of totalitarian foreclosure: then you find yourself a prisoner of generalities and totalizing programs, and representative instances regain their power. Molecular analysis is the will to a molecular power, to a theory and practice which refuse to dispossess the masses of their potential for desire. Contrary to a possible objection, we are not talking about taking on history by looking at the smallest side of things, nor do we claim, like Pascal, that if Cleopatra's nose had been longer, the course of history would

have been changed; it is simply a question of not missing the impact of this totalitarian machine which never stops modifying itself and adapting itself to accord with the relationships of force and societal transformations. Certainly the role of Hitler as an individual was negligible, but his role remains fundamental, inasmuch as he caused a new form of this totalitarian machine to crystallize. He is seen in dreams, in deliriums, in films, in the contorted behavior of policemen, and even on the leather jackets of some gangs who, without knowing anything about Naziism, reproduce the icons of Hitlerism.

Let's return to a question which is at work, in other forms, in the present political situation. After the debacle of 1918 and the crisis of 1929, why wasn't German capitalism content to grasp onto a simple military dictatorship for support? Why Hitler rather than General von Schleicher? Daniel Guérin says, in this context, that large capital hesitated to "deprive itself of this incomparable, irreplaceable means of penetrating into all the cells of society, the organization of the fascist masses." Indeed, a military dictatorship does not compartmentalize the masses in the same way as a party that is organized like a police force. A military dictatorship does not draw on libidinal energy in the same way as a fascist dictatorship, even if certain of their results may seem identical, and even if they happen to result in the same kinds of repressive methods, the same tortures, etc. The conjunction, in the person of Hitler, of at least four libidinal series, caused a mutation of a new desiring machinism to crystallize in the masses:

—A certain plebeian style that put him in a position to have a handle on people who were more or less marked by the socio-democratic and Bolshevik machines.

—A certain veteran-of-war style, symbolized by his Iron Cross from the war of 1914, which made it possible for him to at least neutralize the military staff elements, for want of being able to gain their complete confidence.

—A shop-keeper's opportunism, a spinal flexibility, a slackness, which enabled him to negotiate with the magnates of industry and finance, all the while letting them think that they could easily control and manipulate him.

—Finally, and this is perhaps the essential point, a racist delirium, a mad, paranoiac energy which put him in tune with the collective death instinct which had been released from the charnel houses of the First World War. To be sure, all this is still much too schematic! But the point that I wanted to insist upon, and that I could only allude to, is the fact that we cannot regard as indifferent those local and singular conditions which allowed this mechanical crystallization on the person of Hitler. I insist that it is not a matter of being content with historico-psychoanalytic generalities: today within political and trade union movements, within group-uscules, in family life, academic life, etc., we are witnessing other fascisizing micro-crystallizations, which succeed the phylum of the totalitarian machine. By pretending that the individual has a negligible role in history, they would like to make us think that we can do nothing but stand with hands tied in the face of the hysterical gesticulations or paranoiac manipulations of local

tyrants and bureaucrats of every color. A micro-politics of desire means that henceforth we will refuse to allow any fascist formula to slip by, on whatever scale it may manifest itself, including within the scale of the family or even within the scale of our own personal economy. Through all kinds of means—in particular, movies and television—we are led to believe that Naziism was just a bad moment we had to go through, a sort of historical error, but also a beautiful page in history for the good heroes. And besides was it not touching to see the intertwined flags of capitalism and socialism? We are further led to believe that there were real antagonistic contradictions between the fascist Axis and the Allies. This is a way of concealing the nature of the selection process which was to lead to the elimination of a fascist formula which, after a while, the bourgeoisie finally decided was dangerous. Radek defined Naziism as something external to the bourgeoisie, somewhat like iron bands used by the bourgeoisie, in an attempt to consolidate "capitalism's leaky tank." But wasn't this image a bit too reassuring? Fascism only remained external to a certain type of bourgeoisie, which rejected it only because of its instability and because it stirred excessively powerful forces of desire within the masses. The remedy, which had been welcomed in the paroxysmic phase of the crisis, later seemed too dangerous. But international capitalism could only consider its elimination to the extent that other means were available by which to control class struggle, not to mention totalitarian formulas for subduing the desire of the masses: as soon as Stalinism had "negotiated" this replacement formula, an alliance with it became possible. The Nazi regime never really mastered its internal contradictions; the Führer's practically insoluble mission consisted of an attempt to establish a sort of compromise between different machines of power which fully intended to maintain their autonomy: the military machine, the politico-police factions, the economic machine, etc.¹ At the same time, he had to keep in mind that the revolutionary effervescence of the masses threatened to sway them towards a Bolshevik-style revolution. In fact, the alliance of the Western democracies and totalitarian Stalinism was not formed to "save democracy." It was formed only because of the catastrophic turn which the fascist experiments had taken, and, above all, in response to the deadly form of libidinal metabolism which developed in the masses as a result of these experiments. During this whole period, the planet was seized by a crisis that seemed like the end of the world. Of course, it must not be forgotten that the leftist organizations in Italy and Germany had been liquidated at the very beginning. But why did these organizations collapse like houses of cards? They never offered the masses a real alternative, at any rate, none that could tap their energy of desire, or even divert this energy from the fascist religion (on this subject I find Reich's analysis definitive). It is often asserted that, at their outset, the fascist regimes supplied a minimum of economic solutions to the most urgent problems—an artificial boost to the economy, a reabsorption of unemployment, a large-scale public works program, control of capital. These measures are then contrasted, for example, with the powerlessness of the socio-democratic governments of the Weimar

Republic. Explanations like, "The socialists and communists had a bad program, bad leaders, a bad organization, bad alliances," are considered sufficient. Their deficiencies and betrayals are endlessly enumerated. But nothing in these explanations accounts for the fact that the new totalitarian desiring machine was able to crystallize in the masses to such an extent that it was felt, by international capitalism itself, to be even more dangerous than the regime that came out of the October revolution. What almost everyone refuses to acknowledge is that the fascist machine, in its Italian and German forms, became a threat to capitalism and Stalinism because the masses invested a fantastic collective death instinct in it. By reterritorializing their desire onto a leader, a people, and a race, the masses abolished, by means of a phantasm of catastrophe, a reality which they detested and which the revolutionaries were either unwilling or unable to encroach upon. For the masses, virility, blood, vital space, and death took the place of a socialism that had too much respect for the dominant meanings. And yet, fascism was brought back to these same dominant meanings by a sort of intrinsic bad faith, by a false provocation to the absurd, and by a whole theater of collective hysteria and debility. Fascism simply took a much longer detour than, for example, Stalinism. All fascist meanings stem out of a composite representation of love and death, of Eros and Thanatos now made into one. Hitler and the Nazis were fighting for death, right up to and including the death of Germany; the German masses agreed to follow along and meet their own destruction. How else are we to understand the way they were able to keep the war going for several years after it had been manifestly lost? Beside such a phenomenon, the Stalinist machine seemed much more sensible, especially when viewed from the outside. It is no wonder that English and American capitalism felt few qualms about an alliance with it. After the liquidation of the Third International, Stalinist totalitarianism could appear to the capitalist strategy as a replacement system, having certain advantages over the different forms of fascism and classical dictatorship. Who could be better equipped than the Stalinist police and their agents to control any excessively turbulent movements of the working class, the colonial masses, or any oppressed national minorities? The last World War will thus have been the opportunity to select the most efficient totalitarian machines, those best adapted to the period.

Unlike fascism, capitalist totalitarian machines endeavor to divide, particularize, and molecularize the workers, meanwhile tapping their potentiality for desire. These machines infiltrate the ranks of the workers, their families, their couples, their childhood; they install themselves at the very heart of the workers' subjectivity and vision of the world. Capitalism fears large-scale movements of crowds. Its goal is to have automatic systems of regulation at its command. This regulatory role is given to the State and to the mechanisms of contractualization between the "social partners." And when a conflict breaks out of the pre-established frameworks, capitalism seeks to confine it to economic or local wars. From this standpoint, it must be acknowledged that the Western totalitarian machine has now completely

surpassed its Stalinist counterpart. And yet, Stalinism had the advantage, over Fascism, of greater stability; the party was not put on the same level as the military machine, the police machine, and the economic machine. In effect, Stalinism overcoded all the machines of power, meanwhile keeping the masses under an implacable control. Furthermore, it succeeded in keeping the avant-garde of the international proletariat strung along on a tight leash. The failure of Stalinism, which is no doubt one of the most striking developments in the modern period, evidently stems from the fact that it could not adapt itself to the evolution of the productive forces and, in particular, to what I have called the molecularization of the work force. Inside the USSR, this failure was translated into a series of political and economic crises and into a series of successive slips which restored, to the detriment of the party, a relative autonomy to the technocratic machines of the State and of production, to the army, to the regions, etc. Outside of USSR, this was translated into the chaotic relationships with the popular democracies—rupture with China, foundation of a *de facto* polycentrism within the communist parties. Everywhere, national and regional questions, particularisms once again took on decisive weight. Among other things, this allowed the capitalist countries to recuperate and partially integrate their local communist parties. From this standpoint, Stalin's legacy was completely lost! Of course, Stalinism continues to outlive itself in a certain number of parties and unions, but, in fact, it now operates on the old social-democratic model, and revolutionary struggles, struggles of desire, like May '68 or Lip, tend more and more to escape its influence. Under these conditions, the capitalist system is forced to search internally for new formulas of totalitarianism. And so long as these are not found, capitalism will have to face struggles which it will find situated on unforeseeable fronts (managerial strikes, struggles of immigrants and racial minorities, subversion in the schools, in the prisons, in the asylums, struggles for sexual liberty, etc.) This new situation, where one is no longer dealing with homogeneous social groupings whose action is channeled into purely economic objectives is met by proliferation and exacerbation of repressive responses. Alongside the fascism of the concentration camps, which continue to exist in numerous countries², new forms of molecular fascism are developing: a slow burning fascism, in familialism, in school, in racism, in every kind of ghetto, which advantageously makes up for the crematory ovens. Everywhere, the totalitarian machine is in search of adapted structures, which is to say, structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy. We must abandon, once and for all, the quick and easy formula: "Fascism will not make it again." Fascism has already "made it," and it continues to "make it." It passes through the tightest mesh; it is in constant evolution, to the extent that it shares in a micro-political economy of desire which is itself inseparable from the evolution of the productive forces. Fascism seems to come from the outside, but it finds its energy right at the heart of everyone's desire. We must stop, once and for all, being diverted by the sinister buffooneries of those socio-democrats who are so astonished that their army, which they

said was the most democratic in the world, launches, without notice, the worst of fascist repressions. A military machine, as such, crystallizes a fascist desire, no matter what the political regime may be in the country where it is implanted. Trotsky's army, Mao's army, and Castro's army have been no exceptions: which, nevertheless, in no way detracts from their respective merits! Fascism, like desire, is scattered everywhere, in separate bits and pieces, within the whole social realm; it crystallizes in one place or another, depending on the relationships of force. It can be said of fascism that it is all-powerful and, at the same time, ridiculously weak. And whether it is the former or the latter depends on the capacity of collective arrangements, subject-groups, to connect the social libido, on every level, with the whole range of revolutionary machines of desire.

Translated by Suzanne Fletcher

NOTES

1. It is needless to repeat that all this is too simple: there was not, for example, a homogeneous attitude on the part of the capitalist. Krupp was hostile towards Hitler at first, and only rallied to him after the course was set . . .
2. One of contemporary capitalism's major concerns is the search for forms of totalitarianism tailored to the countries of the Third World.